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Note
Withdrawal of Pleas in Nebraska:
The Rejected Plea Bargain
State v. Evans, 194 Neb. 559, 234 N.W.2d 199 (1975).
The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the
prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called "plea bar-
gaining," is an essential component of the administration of justice.
Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If every criminal
charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Fed-
eral Government would need to multiply by many times the
number of judges and court facilities.1
1. INTRODUCTION
Plea bargaining has become an accepted and widely-used part
of our judicial process.2  The United States Supreme Court in
Santobello v. New York,s noted, however, that all considerations in
favor of plea bargaining presuppose fairness in the agreement
between the accused and a prosecutor.4 Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure 5 sets out the plea bargaining stand-
ards that must be adhered to in federal courts. Nebraska, however,
has no court rule or statutory procedure for the proper administra-
tion of plea bargaining. Instead, the mandates of the Nebraska
supreme court must be relied upon.
This note deals specifically with one particular aspect of the
-plea bargaining process in Nebraska: whether a criminal defendant
has the right to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
6
1. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
2. This note deals solely with the withdrawal of guilty pleas entered
pursuant to plea bargaining. Arguments for and against plea bargain-
ing are considered elsewhere. See generally Berger, The Case Against
Plea Bargaining, 62 A.B.A.J. 621 (1976); Wheatley, Plea Bargaining-
A Case for its Continuance, 59 MAss. L.Q. 31 (1974); Note, The Un-
constitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HAnv. L. REv. 1387 (1970).
3. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
4. Id.
5. See note 49 infra.
6. In State v. Freeman, 193 Neb. 227, 229, 226 N.W.2d 351, 353 (1975),
the Nebraska supreme court recognized that for purposes of deter-
mining whether to allow withdrawal of a plea, a plea of nolo
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entered pursuant to a plea bargain. In State v. Evans," the
Nebraska supreme court held that not only is there no right to with-
draw a guilty plea entered upon a plea bargain, but, absent a mani-
fest injustice, it is improper for a trial judge to permit the with-
drawal of a plea of guilty.8 This note will discuss the implications
of this decision and examine alternatives which merit serious
consideration.
II. THE DECISION
Joel Evans was charged with buiglary and agreed to plead nolo
contendere pursuant to a plea bargain. The county attorney agreed
to recommend a six-month county jail sentence. Contrary to the
terms of the agreement, Evans received a two to four year prison
term in the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex. His motion
to withdraw his plea was overruled, and he appealed his conviction
based on the trial court's denial of that motion. On appeal, Evans
alleged that the trial court abused its discretion, violated his right to
the equal protection of the laws, and denied him due process of law
as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. The Nebraska
supreme court rejected his contentions and affirmed the trial
court's action.9
The trial court was aware of the defendant's reasons for pleading
nolo contendere, because at the time the plea was entered, the
court was informed of the plea bargaining agreement. In addition,
defendant's counsel requested, that the plea be entered with leave
to withdraw it if -the court chose not to honor the county attorney's
recommendation. The request was denied, and the court advised
Evans that it would not be bound by any recommendations and
that any plea made would be binding.10 At the sentencing the
judge advised the defendant that notice was taken of the county
attorney's recommendation but that the judge had chosen not to
follow it. Instead, a two to four year prison sentence was imposed.
Evans's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was denied despite his
contention that he would not have pleaded guilty except for the plea
bargain, and that he entered his plea in reliance upon the plea
bargain being honored.
The supreme court approved the trial court's refusal to let the
defendant enter his plea with leave to withdraw if the plea bargain
contendere is equivalent to a plea of guilty. In discussing the rele-
vant cases, the two may therefore be considered synonymous.
7. 194 Neb. 559, 234 N.W.2d 199 (1975).
8. Id. at 564, 234 N.W.2d at 202.
9. Id. at 560, 234 N.W.2d at 200.
10. Id. at 560-61, 234 N.W.2d at 200.
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was not accepted. Specifically, it held that "[a] trial judge should
not enter into any agreement that the defendant will be permitted
to withdraw his plea if he does not accept the county attorney's
recommendation on sentence."' '  Further, in accordance with its
decision in State v. Turner,'2 the court acknowledged that the
Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty13 promulgated by the
American Bar Association outline the minimum procedural stand-
ards for the taking of guilty pleas. In the view of the court, these
standards mandate that "[i]t is not proper for a trial judge to
permit the withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere unless
such withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.'
14
Thus, only in limited circumstances will withdrawal of a guilty
plea be allowed.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
The majority, in an opinion written by Judge Spencer, appar-
ently relied on the ABA Standards as its sole authority. However,
those standards in fact do little to support the court's conclusion
that a trial judge cannot permit withdrawal of a guilty plea absent
a manifest injustice.
Section 2.1' 5 of the standards concerns the general subject of
plea withdrawal. More specifically, section 2.1 (b) provides that
"[i]n the absence of a showing that withdrawal is necessary to cor-
rect a manifest injustice, a defendant may not withdraw his plea of
guilty or nolo contendere as a matter of right once the plea has been
11. Id. at 561, 234 N.W.2d at 201.
12. 186 Neb. 424, 183 N.W.2d 763 (1971).
13. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRnIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as
ABA STANDARDS]. Formulation of these standards was authorized by
the ABA in 1964. The ABA's Special Committee on Mlinimum Stand-
ards for the Administration of Criminal Justice presented a tentative
draft in 1967, and on February 19, 1968, the ABA House of Delegates
approved an amended version of the draft.
14. 194 Neb. at 564, 234 N.W.2d at 202.
15. 2.1 Plea withdrawal.
(a) The court should allow the defendant to with-
draw his plea of guilty or nolo contendere whenever the
defendant, upon a timely motion for withdrawal, proves
that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injus-
tice.
(i) A motion for withdrawal is timely if made
with due diligence, considering the nature of the
allegations therein, and is not necessarily barred be-
cause made subsequent to judgment or sentence.
(ii) Withdrawal is necessary to correct a mani-
fest injustice whenever the defendant proves that:
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accepted by the court."16 Thus, a defendant does not have an abso-
lute right to withdraw his plea. However, that same section con-
tinues: "Before sentence, the court in its discretion may allow the
defendant to withdraw his plea for any fair and just reason unless
the prosecution has been substantially prejudiced by reliance on
the defendant's plea."'71  Thus, a trial judge should at least have
the opportunity to allow withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sen-
tencing. Yet under the supreme court's holding, the trial judge
would not have had the discretion to grant a motion to withdraw
even if Evans had made the motion prior to sentencing.' As
pointed out in Judge McCown's dissent, the majority apparently
ignored the latter provision even though they had previously
(1) he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel guaranteed to him by constitution, statute,
or rule;
(2) the plea was not entered or ratified by the
defendant or a person authorized to so act in his
behalf;
(3) the plea was involuntary, or was entered
without knowledge of the charge or that the sen-
tence actually imposed could be imposed; or
(4) he did not receive the charge or sentence
concessions contemplated by the plea greement
and the prosecuting attorney failed to seek or not
to oppose these concessions as promised in the plea
agreement; or
(5) he did not receive the charge or sentence
concessions contemplated by the plea agreement
concurred in by the court, and he did not affirm
his plea after being advised that the court no
longer concurred and being called upon to either
affirm or withdraw his plea.
(iii) The defendant may move for withdrawal of
his plea without alleging that he is innocent of the
charge to which the plea has been entered.
(b) In the absence of a showing that withdrawal is
necessary to correct a manifest injustice, a defendant
may not withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo contendere
as a matter of right once the plea has been accepted by
the court. Before sentence, the court in its discretion
may allow the defendant to withdraw his plea for any
fair and just reason unless the prosecution has been sub-
stantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's
plea.
ABA STANDARDS § 2.1. The court failed to include § 2.1 (a) (ii) (5) in
its reference to the standard. See State v. Evans, 194 Neb. 559, 562,
234 N.W.2d 199, 201 (1975). Section 2.1 (a) (ii) (5) was an amendment
to the tentative draft, and was included in the approved draft as
passed in February 1968. The supreme court quoted only the tenta-
tive draft; the approved draft is set forth in full above.
16. ABA STANDARDS § 2.1 (b).
17. Id.
18. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
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affirmed the ABA Standards in total.19
In Jurgenson v. State,20 the supreme court emphasized the
discretion of the trial judge:
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, and to be allowed to
enter a plea of not guilty, addresses itself to the discretion of the
trial judge before whom the plea is entered, and, in the absence of
a clear abuse of that discretion, the appellate court will not inter-
fere.21
In contrast, the requirement that the defendant prove a manifest
injustice in order to sustain a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
appeared in State v. Johnson.2 2  At this point, the trial judge's
discretion appeared to be somewhat limited. Only where "mani-
fest injustice '2 3 was shown could the trial judge allow a guilty plea
to be withdrawn whether entered pursuant to a plea bargain or not.
Apparently, the matter of discretion of the trial judge was not
yet settled as demonstrated by the court's holding in State v.
Daniels: 
2 4
In the absence of a showing that a withdrawal is necessary to cor-
rect a manifest injustice, a defendant may not withdraw his plea
of guilty or nolo contendere as a matter of right once the plea of
guilty or nolo contendere has been accepted by the court. Before
sentence the court in its discretion may allow the defendant to
withdraw his plea for any fair and just reason unless the prosecu-
tion has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defend-
ant's plea.2 5
The court was therefore granted discretion to allow withdrawal up
to the time of sentencing. Again, however, this granting of dis-
cretion was apparently taken away and the court held that a plea
will not be permitted to be withdrawn in the absence of fraud,
19. The majority opinion now holds that it is not proper for
a trial judge to permit the withdrawal of a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere unless such withdrawal is necessary to cor-
rect a manifest injustice, and also holds that a trial judge
should not enter into an agreement in advance that the de-
fendant will be permitted to withdraw his plea if the court
does not accept the recommendation on the sentence. The
opinion completely ignores the second sentence of section
2.1(b) of the ABA Standards, without any attempt to limit
or overrule it, and after having first reaffirmed the complete
standards.
194 Neb. at 566, 234 N.W.2d at 203 (McCown, J., dissenting).
20. 166 Neb. 111, 88 N.W.2d 129 (1958).
21. Id. at 118, 88 N.W.2d at 133.
22. 187 Neb. 26, 187 N.W.2d 99 (1971).
23. See ABA STANDARDS § 2.1 (a) (ii), supra note 15.
24. 190 Neb. 602, 211 N.W.2d 127 (1973).
25. Id. at 605, 211 N.W.2d at 129.
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mistake, or other improper means used in its procurement. 26 The
case at hand evidently requires a showing of manifest injustice in
order to withdraw a guilty plea. Yet, in Evans, the supreme court
relied solely on the ABA Standards, which at the very least allow
the trial court discretion to allow withdrawal of a guilty plea prior
to sentencing.
2 7
Admittedly, in this case, Evans did not move to withdraw his
plea of guilty prior to sentencing. He was aware of the judge's
decision before the motion to withdraw was made. However, the
commentary 28 to the ABA Standards makes it clear that sentence or
judgment should not necessarily cut off the opportunity for plea
withdrawal. Furthermore, it has been held in one jurisdiction that
a defendant will be permitted to withdraw his plea after judgment
and sentencing, but before the sentence is filed with the clerk of the
court.29 This argument would undoubtedly have little impact in
Nebraska, yet under the ABA Standards as accepted by the supreme
court, at the very least the trial judge should have discretion up
until the time of sentencing. This may have no bearing on Evans's
situation, but will have a substantial effect on relevant future
cases.
Furthermore, section 2.1 (a) 30 of the ABA Standards provides
that withdrawal of a plea should be allowed whenever the defend-
ant proves that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest
injustice. The word should, of course, is not exclusive. It only
describes situations in which plea withdrawal must be allowed,
and clearly does not exclude other possible circumstances. The
commentary to section 2.1 (b) points this out: "The standard does
recognize the generally acknowledged discretion of the judge to
permit withdrawal before sentence even in the absence of a mani-
26. See State v. Freeman, 193 Neb. 227, 226 N.W.2d 351 (1975); State v.
Williams, 191 Neb. 57, 213 N.W.2d 727 (1974).
27. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
28. The standard expresses the position, consistent with that
found in the federal system but contrary to that taken in most
states, that sentence or judgment should not necessarily cut
off the opportunity for plea withdrawal.
ABA STANDARDS § 2.1 (a) (i), commentary, at 55.
29. Ballard v. State, 131 Ga. App. 847, 848, 207 S.E.2d 246, 248 (1974).
As to what constitutes finality in sentencing, the Georgia court stated:
When is a sentence pronounced? Does the mere signing of
the written judgment constitute the pronouncement of the
sentence? No, there is one step further to be taken before
pronouncement of the sentence is complete. The judgment
must be in writing, it must be signed, and it must be filed
with the clerk of the court.
30. See note 15 supra.
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fest injustice."3 1 Yet, the supreme court on the basis of these stand-
ards alone held that "[i] t is not proper for a trial judge to permit
the withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere unless such
withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.1
3 2
The supreme court did not restrict its discussion to section 2.1.
It included a treatment of Part III of the ABA Standards which
deals specifically with plea discussions and plea agreements.3 3 The
specific responsibilities of the trial judge in dealing with plea agree-
ments are explained in section 3.3.34 In quoting this provision, the
court omitted and thus failed to consider a sentence making it the
responsibility of the trial judge to grant the defendant a right to
withdraw his plea where the judge had previously concurred in the
31. ABA STANDARDS § 2.1(b) commentary, at 58. Other commentary in
the ABA Standards further indicates the nonexclusivity of the excep-
tion:
No attempt has been made in the standards to identify all
the pressures upon a defendant which could render a plea
involuntary. Although a plea agreement reached in conform-
ance with these standards may make the plea of guilty or
nolo contendere more attractive to the defendant, the result-
ing plea is in no sense involuntary . . . . Whether certain
inducements beyond those authorized in the standards, such as
a promise not to prosecute another person, renders the plea
involuntary . . . is left to judicial decision.
Id. § 2.1 (a) (ii) commentary, at 57.
32. 194 Neb. at 564, 234 N.W.2d at 202.
33. See id. at 563-64, 234 N.W.2d at 201-02.
34. 3.3 Responsibilities of the trial judge.
(a) The trial judge should not participate in plea
discussions.
(b) If a tentative plea agreement has been reached
which contemplates entry of a plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere in the expectation that other charges before
that court will be dismissed or that sentence concessions
will be granted, upon request of the parties the trial judge
may permit the disclosure to him of the tentative agree-
ment and the reasons therefore in advance of the time for
tender of the plea. He may then indicate to the prosecut-
ing attorney and defense counsel whether he will concur
in the proposed disposition if the information in the pre-
sentence report is consistent with the representations
made to him. If the trial judge concurs, but later de-
cides that the final disposition should not include the
charge or sentence concessions contemplated by the plea
agreement, he shall so advise the defendant and then call
upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw his plea
of guilty or nolo contendere.
(c) When a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is
tendered or received as a result of a prior plea agree-
ment, the trial judge should give the agreement due con-
sideration, but notwithstanding its existence he should
reach an independent decision on whether to grant charge
or sentence concessions under the principles set forth in
section 1.8.
ABA STJA I s § 3.3.
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bargain and now disapproves of it.35 Without this added provi-
sion the standard announced by the supreme court is severely
limited. This is particularly troublesome in light of the fact that
the intent of the ABA Standards is not to restrict plea withdrawal
solely to cases where a manifest injustice exists.36 At the very
least, the trial judge should have the discretion to decide based on
the particular circumstances of each case.
The whole purpose of the plea bargain is to induce the defendant
to plead guilty, and thus expedite the judicial process. Since the
purpose of a plea bargain is to get a guilty plea, it may be inferred
that absent that agreement, a defendant will plead not guilty to the
original charges brought. Any other interpretation is contrary to
the concept of plea bargaining itself. The supreme court through its
interpretation of the ABA Standards made no distinction between
pleas made purely voluntarily and those made as a result of an
inducement. It seems highly unfair that the same rules are main-
tained where the circumstances surrounding a plea bargain are
substantially different from a noninduced plea. Yet that is exactly
the present situation in Nebraska.
Section 3.3 (c) of the ABA Standards provides that a judge
should give a plea bargain due consideration, but that he should
reach an independent decision on whether to grant the desired con-
cessions. 37 The court expressed the fear that to allow plea with-
drawals would destroy this independence.3 8 However, nowhere in
section 3.3 (c) are the independence of the judge and the defend-
ant's right to withdraw a guilty plea equated. The standard refers
solely to independence in determining whether to grant the con-
ditions of the plea bargain. It is essential that the judge maintain
this independence, but that does not preclude him from informing
the defendant that the agreement is not satisfactory, and from
allowing the defendant a chance to reconsider his position. Fur-
35. As was the case with § 2.1, see note 15 supra, the Nebraska supreme
court omitted another important part of § 3.3 (b) of the 1968 Approved
Draft. The court quoted the tentative draft, which provides:
If the trial judge concurs but the final disposition does not
include the charge or sentence concessions contemplated in
the plea agreement, he shall state for the record what infor-
mation in the presentence report contributed to his decision
not to grant these concessions.
194 Neb. at 563-64, 234 N.W.2d at 202. The final amended version is
set forth in note 37 supra.
36. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
37. See note 34 supra.
38. 194 Neb. at 564, 234 N.W.2d at 202.
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thermore, the importance of plea bargaining is its time-saving
feature. When it is discovered that a guilty plea is binding regard-
less of the judge's determination, some will be less likely to take the
chance of having a plea bargain rejected, and demand a trial im-
mediately. Thus, if the goal is to expedite the judicial process, the
supreme court's rule is self-defeating since the state will more
often be forced to prove its case than it otherwise would.
IV. THE ALTERNATIVE
Admittedly, proper application of the ABA Standards would
more than likely not have changed the result in the Evans case.
The supreme court probably would have held that the trial judge
did not abuse his discretion in denying withdrawal of the plea since
no manifest injustice was shown. However, the ABA Standards
presented certain defects in need of resolution. Thus, in June of
1972, the ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice proposed
an updated set of standards,39 which was adopted by the ABA
House of Delegates in August of 1972. The 1972 ABA Standards
apparently were intended to supplement and clarify the earlier
version.40 In spite of this, the Nebraska supreme court refused to
accept them.
41
Section 4.142 of the 1972 standards concerns the role of the judge
in plea discussions and plea agreements. The standards clearly
provide that in a plea bargaining situation, the judge should permit
withdrawal of the plea in any case in which he determines not to
grant the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by the agree-
39. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRnM AL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE (Approved Draft 1972)
[hereinafter cited as 1972 ABA STANDARDS].
40. See 1972 ABA STANDARDS § 4.1 commentary, at 52.
41. 194 Neb. at 565, 234 N.W.2d at 202.
42. 4.1 Role of the judge in plea discussions and plea agreements.
(a) The trial judge should not be involved with plea
discussions before the parties have reached an agreement
other than to facilitate fulfillment of the obligation of
the prosecutor and defense counsel to explore with each
other the possibility of disposition without trial.
(b) The trial judge should not accept a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere without first inquiring whether there
is a plea agreement and, if there is one, requiring that it
be disclosed on the record.
(c) If the plea agreement contemplates the granting
of charge or sentence concessions by the trial judge, he
should:
(i) unless he then and there grants such conces-
sions, inform the defendant as to the role of the judge
with respect to such agreements, as provided in the
following subparagraphs;
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ment.43 The Nebraska supreme court went so far as to hypothesize
that under these standards the defendant would be allowed to with-
draw his guilty plea.44 However, instead of recognizing that the
1972 ABA Standards were meant to supplement the 1968 version,
the court set the updated standards aside simply by disapproving of
them. The court thus affirmed the old standard while giving no
reason whatsoever for rejecting the policies set out in the new.
This is particularly of concern since the court relied solely on the
American Bar Association Standards for its authority.
Of utmost interest are the words of Chief Justice Burger in
Santobello v. New York: "[W]hen a plea rests in any significant
degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can
be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise
must be fulfilled. '45 As the defendant in Evans argued in his
brief, the prosecutor will now be able to make a promise to the
defendant which provides the inducement or consideration for a
guilty plea, and, even though the prosecutor may not break the
promise, the court may do it for him.46 This is not to imply that
there should be an absolute right to have a plea bargain accepted.
That would clearly impinge upon judicial discretion. However,
whether the prosecutor breaks a promise or the judge disapproves
of the bargain, the impact is the same as far as the defendant is
concerned. If he is not allowed to at least withdraw the plea when
the inducements which led to the plea are removed, the defendant
is placed in a highly unfair situation. This can easily lead to the
prosecutorial tactic of making promises in the knowledge that the
judge will not approve the terms of the bargain.4 7 Nowhere in the
(ii) give the agreement due consideration, but
notwithstanding its existence reach an independent
decision on whether to grant charge or sentence con-
cessions; and
(iii) permit withdrawal of the plea (or, if it has
not yet been accepted, withdrawal of the tender of
the plea) in any case in which the judge determines
not to grant the charge or sentence concessions con-
templated by the agreement.
(d) The trial judge may decline to give considera-
tion to a plea agreement until after completion of a pre-
sentence investigation or may, in accordance with ABA
Standards, Pleas of Guilty § 3.3(b), indicate his condi-
tional concurrence prior thereto.
1972 ABA STANDARDS § 4.1.
43. See id. § 4.1(c) (ii).
44. 194 Neb. at 565, 234 N.W.2d at 202.
45. 404 U.S. at 262.
46. See State v. Evans, 194 Neb. 559, 564, 234 N.W.2d 199, 202 (1975).
47. For a general discussion of prosecutorial discretion see Cox, Prosecu-
torial Discretion: An Overview, 13 Am. C~am. L. REv. 383 (1976);
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enumerated "manifest injustices" of section 2.148 of the ABA Stand-
ards is this situation covered; thus, the defendant would appar-
ently be left solely to the mercy of the trial judge.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure now provide that when
a court rejects a plea agreement, the defendant shall be given the
opportunity to withdraw his plea.49 Although the federal rules are
not applicable to the state courts, in reference to the former version
of this same rule, the Nebraska supreme court previously stated
that "it is good practice to comply with Rule 11." 50 Rule 11 (e) (4)
allows withdrawal as a matter of right and at least in a federal
criminal case, Evans would have been allowed to change his plea.51
Lagoy, Senna & Siegel, An Empirical Study on Information Usage for
Prosecutorial Decision Making in Plea Negotiations, 13 Am. Cnw. L.
REV. 435 (1976); Thomas & Fitch, Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13
AM. CIm. L. REV. 507 (1976).
48. See note 15 supra.
49. FED. R. Calm. P. 11 (e) provides in part:
(2) Notice of Such Agreement. If a plea agreement has
been reached by the parties, the court shall, on the record,
require the disclosure of the agreement in open court or,
on a showing of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea
is offered. Thereupon the court may accept or reject the
agreement, or may defer its decision as to the acceptance or
rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the
presentence report.
(3) Acceptance of a Plea Agreement. If the court ac-
cepts the plea agreement, the court shall inform the defend-
ant that it will embody in the judgment and sentence the dis-
position provided for in the plea agreement.
(4) Rejection of a Plea Agreement. If the court rejects
the plea agreement, the court shall, on the record, inform the
parties of this fact, advise defendant personally in open court
or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, that the court
is not bound by the plea agreement, afford the defendant the
opportunity to then withdraw his plea, and advise the defend-
ant that if he persists in his guilty plea or plea of nolo con-
tendere the disposition of the case may be less favorable to
the defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement.
For a discussion of the recent changes in Rule 11 see Note, Revised
Rule 11: Tighter Guidelines for Pleas in Criminal Cases, 44 FORDuAm
L. REV. 1010 (1976).
50. State v. Leger, 190 Neb. 352, 354, 208 N.W.2d 276, 278 (1973).
51. Even before the adoption of the new federal rule, some federal courts
had followed what was to become the statutory procedure. In United
States ex rel. Culbreath v. Rundle, 466 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1972), the
court held that a defendant should be permitted to withdraw his
guilty plea, particularly where there is no governmental claim of
prejudice or harm. In United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F.
Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), the court relied on fundamental fairness
as a concept of due process of law in allowing the withdrawal of a
guilty plea.
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In applying the California plea bargaining statute,5 2 it has been
held that a court may not impose judgment contrary to the bargain
without giving the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his guilty
plea. 53 Pennsylvania has a similar rule, under which a judge decid-
ing not to concur in a plea bargain must permit the defendant to
withdraw his plea. 54 As stated in Commonwealth v. Barrett:5 5
It is to be emphasized that we are to hereafter consider a plea
of guilty as a "tender", and as such not be considered as irrevoc-
ably "made". Rule 319, we believe, does no more than affirm the
long line of cases in this and other jurisdictions that recognize that
"manifest injustice" may only be avoided if the accused is afforded
necessary safeguards against the possibility of an unfulfilled bar-
gain, which is either the sole or primary inducement in the tender
of a guilty plea in the first instance. This clear mandate of this
rule and the cases upon which it is founded supports the conclu-
sion that the appellant should have been permitted to withdraw
his plea.56
In affirming Barrett, the Pennsylvania court in Commonwealth v.
Sutherland57 expressed the view that "[t]he ABA Standards and
Barrett are premised on the idea that it would be unfair to accept
a guilty plea which was induced in part by a recommendation of a
lenient sentence and then impose a greater sentence. '5 8 It is signifi-
cant to note the Pennsylvania court's view of the unique nature of
plea bargaining itself as opposed to a purely voluntary guilty plea.
Finally, a Georgia statute59 provides that a plea of guilty may be
withdrawn at any time before the sentence is pronounced. Under
that statute, unless a defendant freely, voluntarily and willingly
52. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5 (West 1970):
If the court approves of the plea, it shall inform the de-
fendant prior to the making of the plea that (1) its approval
is not binding, (2) it may, at the time set for the hearing on
the application for probation or pronouncement of judgment,
withdraw its approval in the light of further consideration
of the matter, and (3) in such case, the defendant shall be
permitted to withdraw his plea if he desires to do so. The
court shall also cause an inquiry to be made of the defend-
ant to satisfy itself that the plea is freely and voluntarily
made, and that there is a factual basis for such a plea.
53. See People v. Johnson, 10 Cal. 3d 868, 872, 519 P.2d 604, 606, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 556, 558 (1974); People v. Ramos, 26 Cal. App. 3d 108, 110-11,
102 Cal. Rptr. 502, 504 (4th Dist. 1972). See also Comment, An Offer
You Can't Refuse: The Current Status of Plea Bargaining in Cali-
fornia, 7 PAc. L.J. 80 (1976).
54. See PA. R. Cnmv. P. 319(b) (3) (Pamphlet 1976).
55. 223 Pa. Super. 163, 299 A.2d 30 (1972).
56. Id. at 170, 299 A.2d at 33.
57. 234 Pa. Super. 520, 340 A.2d 582 (1975).
58. Id. at 524, 340 A.2d at 584.
59. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1404 (1972).
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accepts the sentence, he has the privilege of withdrawing his plea.60
Thus, in any of the above jurisdictions, Evans would have had the
right to withdraw his plea.
The lack of a statutory provision has not, however, stopped other
state courts from adopting standards of their own. Based solely on
the ABA Standards,61 the Minnesota supreme court has held that
a "manifest injustice" occurs where contemporaneously with the
plea of guilty and before sentence is imposed the court is fully
apprised of the terms of a plea agreement and declines to give it
effect. Under such circumstances, if the state can show no prej-
udice by reliance on the plea, it is incumbent on the court to permit
the guilty plea to be withdrawn.62
Thus, in Minnesota, the failure of the trial judge to approve a plea
bargain is a manifest injustice and the plea is allowed to be with-
drawn.
More recently section 4.163 of the 1972 ABA Standards has been
utilized to grant a right of withdrawal of guilty pleas. Although
not adopting it as a mandatory rule, the New Hampshire supreme
court has recognized that a trial judge may think it prudent to
follow the more recent standard.64  Similarly, the Iowa supreme
court, in State v. Fisher,65 adopted those standards as a mandatory
rule,6 6 and Connecticut applies the rule whenever a court disap-
proves of a plea bargain.
6 7
Finally, the work of the American Law Institute on the subject
should be examined. The final draft of its Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure68 was adopted in May of 1975. Section
350.6 of that proposal provides:
If, at the time of sentencing, the court for any reason deter-
mines to impose a sentence more severe than that provided for in
a plea agreement between the parties, the court shall inform the
defendant of that fact and shall inform the defendant that the
court will entertain a motion to withdraw the plea. The court after
pronouncing the sentence of a defendant who has pleaded guilty or
60. See Ballard v. State, 131 Ga. App. 847, 850, 207 S.E.2d 246, 248-49
(1974).
61. See note 15 supra.
62. State v. Loyd, 291 Minn. 528, 531, 190 N.W.2d 123, 125 (1971).
63. See note 42 supra.
64. See State v. Farris, 114 N.H. 355, 358, 320 A.2d 642, 644 (1974).
65. 223 N.W.2d 243 (Iowa 1974).
66. The Fisher decision, however, has apparently been limited by State v.
Parrish, 232 N.W.2d 511 (Iowa 1975).
67. See Quintana v. Robinson, 31 Conn. Supp. 22, 319 A.2d 515 (Super.
Ct. 1973).
68. ALl MODEL CODE OF PE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Proposed Official
Draft, April 15, 1975).
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nolo contendere shall inquire of the defendant personally whether
the sentence pronounced violates any agreement or understanding
the defendant had with respect to the sentence. If the court deter-
mines that the sentence pronounced is inconsistent with an agree-
ment, or that it differs from the defendant's understanding in such
a way that it would be unjust to permit the defendant's plea to
stand, it shall vacate the plea.69
Under this standard it is the defendant's right to withdraw his
guilty plea whenever a court determines to impose a sentence more
severe than is provided for in the plea agreement.
V. CONCLUSION
It would be misleading to imply that Nebraska is the only state
adhering strictly to the rule requiring a showing of manifest injus-
tice for a plea to be withdrawn and allowing the trial judge no dis-
cretion.70 However, the more desirable rule gives the defendant a
right to withdraw. As Judge McCown of the Supreme Court of
Nebraska stated:
It is difficult to understand the reluctance of the court to accept a
rule which all federal courts and an overwhelming majority of all
state courts already follow. We are cited to no state court which
recognizes plea discussions and plea agreements as an appropriate
part of the administration of criminal justice which has refused to
follow the rule since Santobello v. New York .... The majority
opinion here is a step backward in the continuing search for even-
handed justice.71
Rick L. Ediger '77
69. Id. § 350.6.
70. See Rotenberg, The Progress of Plea Bargaining: The ABA Standards
and Beyond, 8 CoN. L. REv. 44 (1975); 17 S. TEx. L.J. 343 (1976);
Annot., 66 A.L.R.3d 902 (1975).
71. 194 Neb. at 568, 234 N.W.2d at 204 (dissenting opinion).
